Constitutional Law--Regulation of Filling Station Price Signs (State v. Hobson, 83 A.2d 846 (Del. 1951)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 26 
Number 2 Volume 26, May 1952, Number 2 Article 12 
May 2013 
Constitutional Law--Regulation of Filling Station Price Signs (State 
v. Hobson, 83 A.2d 846 (Del. 1951)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1952) "Constitutional Law--Regulation of Filling Station Price Signs (State v. 
Hobson, 83 A.2d 846 (Del. 1951))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 26 : No. 2 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss2/12 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ever, may be considered a step in the right direction, guiding state
courts to a more vigilant protection of personal liberties.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REGULATION OF FILLING STATION
PRICE SIGN.-Defendant, owner and operator of a retail gasoline
station, was arrested and charged with the violation of a Delaware
statute regulating the location and maximum size of motor fuels price
signs.' Specifically, the information charged him with the display
of signs with dimensions in excess of the statutory maximum. De-
fendant moved to quash the information, asserting that the regula-
tory statute was an unlawful infringement on the right of free speech,
unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce, and was a depriva-
tion of property without due process of law.2 Held, the subject stat-
ute does not offend the constitutional guarantee of free speech, nor
does it constitute an unlawful burden on interstate commerce.3 It
does, however, effect a deprivation of property without due process
of law, and is therefore unconstitutional. State v. Hobson, 83 A. 2d
846 (Del. 1951).
ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.' Similarly, one should not
reject a piecemeal wisdom, merely because it hobbles towards the truth with
backward glances." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 47 (1949); see Mann,
Rutledge and Cizdl Liberties, 25 IND. L. J. 532, 551 (1950).
1 "Every retail dealer in motor fuel shall publicly display and maintain
on each pump or other dispensing device, from which motor fuel is sold by
him, at least one sign and not more than two signs stating the price per gallon
of the motor fuel sold by him from such pump or device, which price shall
be the total price for such motor fuel, including all State and Federal taxes.
Said sign or signs shall be of a size not larger than four inches by six
inches ....
"No signs stating or relating to the prices of motor fuel, and no signs de-
signed or calculated to cause the public to believe that they state or relate to
the price of motor fuel, other than the signs referred to in the preceding para-
graph, shall be posted or displayed on or about the premises where motor fuel
is sold at retail." 48 LAws o DzLAwAnm c. -, § 1 (1951), quoted in State
v. Hobson, 83 A. 2d 846, 849-50 (Del. 1951).
2 The defendant asserted two other defenses which were not sustained, and
which will not be treated here. The first was a contention that the act con-
flicted with the ceiling price regulations of the Office of Price Stabilization,
and hence was invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion. The other contention was grounded on a supposed formal deviation from
that requirement of the Delaware Constitution, which provides that no bill
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in its title. State
v. Hobson, 83 A. 2d 846, 850 (Del. 1951).
3 The court disposed of this contention with the assertion that retail sales
of gasoline are intrastate rather than interstate in character. It further opined
that even if the sales were to be considered as interstate in nature, they were
nevertheless subject to regulation in the absence of a showing of discrimina-
tion. Id. at 852-53.
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RECENT DECISIONS
Statutes similar to the one considered in the instant case have
been enacted in twelve states,4 and have been the subject of appellate
consideration in sLx of them. 5  In Massachusetts 6 and New York,7
the provisions have been sustained over constitutional objections,
while in Connecticut,8 Michigan, 9 and New Jersey,10 they have been
struck down as inconsistent with federal and/or state organic laws.
Contestants have generally predicated their objections to this
type of legislation on the ground that the statute effects a deprivation
of property without due process of law. 11 In evaluating these objec-
tions, the courts, in these cases, have generally proceeded on the
assumption that sign-posting, a lawful incident to the conduct of busi-
ness, is a property right.12 Moreover, all courts have recognized the
state's power to regulate this right, subject to the requirements of due
process as set forth in Nebbia v. New York.13 There it was said that
the guaranty of due process "... . demands only that the law shall not
be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected
4 Alabama (provides that price signs shall be of a certain minimum size);
California (minimum and maximum); Connecticut (maximum); Iowa (mini-
mum); Massachusetts (maximum); Michigan (maximum); Nebraska (mini-
mum); New Jersey (minimum and maximum); Pennsylvania (minimum and
maximum); Rhode Island (maximum); Utah (minimum); Wisconsin (mini-
mum). Am ERCAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, MImEoGRAsH TC 108 (March 4,
1952).
5 State v. Miller, 126 Conn. 373, 12 A. 2d 192 (1940); Commonwealth v.
Slome 321 Mass. 713, 75 N. E. 2d 517 (1947); Merit Oil Co. v. Director,
319 Vass. 301, 65 N. E. 2d 529 (1946) ; Slome v. Godley, 304 Mass. 187, 23
N. E. 2d 133 (1939); Levy v. City of Pontiac, 331 Mich. 100, 49 N. W. 2d
80 (1951); Regal Oil Co. v. State, 123 N. J. L. 456, 10 A. 2d 495 (Sup. Ct.
1939); People v. Arlen Service Stations, Inc., 284 N. Y. 340, 31 N. E. 2d
184 (1940) ; People v. Bluestein, 284 N. Y. 796, 31 N. E. 2d 924 (1940).6 Commonwealth v. Slome, 321 Mass. 713, 75 N. E. 2d 517 (1947) ; Merit
Oil Co. v. Director, 319 Mass. 301, 65 N. E. 2d 529 (1946); Slome v. Godley,
304 Mass. 187, 23 N. E. 2d 133 (1939).
7 People v. Arlen Service Stations, Inc., 284 N. Y. 340, 31 N. E. 2d 184(1940); People v. Bluestein, 284 N. Y. 796, 31 N. E. 2d 924 (1940).
8 State v. Miller, 126 Conn. 373, 12 A. 2d 192 (1940).
9 Levy v. City of Pontiac, 331 Mich. 100, 49 N. W. 2d 80 (1951).
LO Regal Oil Co. v. State, 123 N. J. L. 456, 10 A. 2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
11See Note, 20 B. U. L. Ray. 345 (1940), where the student author was
of the opinion that the divergent conclusions reached by the Massachusetts and
New Jersey courts on similar statutes could be explained by resort to an ex-
amination of their differing constitutional backgrounds. The Massachusetts
courts, he asserted, have alvays given approval to a liberal concept of police
power to be exercised by the legislature, while the New Jersey courts have
never allowed rights of private property to be infringed upon except in cases
of extreme necessity. In 28 GEO. L. J. 1130 (1940), another writer assayed
that the true intent and purpose of these statutes is to regulate competition
(an assumption somewhat justified by a reading of Regal Oil Co. v. State,
supra note 10), and his discussion was accordingly channeled into a considera-
tion of legislation designed to regulate competition.
12 See State v. Miller, 126 Conn. 373, 12 A. 2d 192, 193 (1940); State v.
Hobson, 83 A. 2d 846, 855 (Del. 1951).
13291 U. S. 502 (1934).
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shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained." 14
In the main, these statutes have been designed to prevent fraud
on the consumer-an admittedly legitimate goal for legislative ac-
tion.15 Thus the principal inquiry in all these cases has been whether
or not the limitations on the number and size of price signs to be
displayed bears a reasonable relation to the prevention of fraud. The
courts of Massachusetts and New York, as noted above, have been
unwilling to disturb the legislative finding that they are reasonable;
those in Connecticut, Michigan and New Jersey have accorded less
respect to the legislature's pronouncement.
The divergent conclusions reached as to the validity of the sign-
posting laws stem, therefore, not from a disparity of opinion as to
the basic constitutional doctrines, but rather are the result of differing
views as to the weight to be given to the legislative conclusion that
such statutes will accomplish the desired purpose.
It is submitted that those courts which require the state to es-
tablish the relation of the means employed to the end intended have
voiced a better rule. The right to property is federally guaranteed;
when the state seeks to limit that right, it should bear the burden of
establishing the reasonableness of its act.16 Nevertheless, it is im-
possible to ignore those decisions of the Supreme Court which seem
to indicate a contrary trend. Indeed, it would seem to be the rule
that "[T]he extent to which, as means, they [state regulations] con-
duce to that end, the degree of the efficiency, the closeness of their
relation to the end sought to be attained, are matters addressed to the
judgment of the legislature, and not that of the court. It is enough if
it can be seen that in any degree, or under any reasonably conceivable
circumstances, there is an actual relation between the means and the
end." 17 So tested, the subject statutes would seem to meet the test
of federal due process.
This is not to imply that the decision in the instant case was
erroneous. Regulations which accord with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's command of due process, may nevertheless fail the test when
challenged under the comparable provision of a state's constitution.
Due process has a variable meaning; the courts of one state may jus-
tifiably impose more stringent standards of legislative conduct than
do those of another.18
14 Id. at 525.
is Schmidinger v. City of Chicago, 226 U. S. 578 (1913).
'I So opined Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissenting in Nebbia v. New York,
291 U. S. 502, 548 (1934).
17 Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 272 (1932); United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938) ; see South Carolina State High-
way Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U. S. 177, 190-91 (1938);
Purity Extract and Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 201-2 (1912).
Is See note 11 .rpra.
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RECENT DECISIONS
In the instant case, the defendant advanced the further conten-
tion that the limitation on the size of signs to be displayed violated
the constitutional right to free speech. This contention was rejected
by the Delaware court on the simple assertion that the guarantees of
the First Amendment were not intended to protect such commercial
activities as are here involved.19 Although some state courts have
taken a contrary position,20 reference to the utterings of the Supreme
Court 2 1 would seem to support the conclusion reached in the instant
case.
The decision on this latter point is an important one. Ordi-
narily, the presumption of constitutionality, which attends regulatory
legislation affecting commercial interests, is greatly weakened when
the contested measure threatens to transgress a specific prohibition
of the Bill of Rights.22  If this limitation on the presumption of con-
stitutionality could be applied to the subject statutes, via a free speech
objection, the onus of proving their substantial relation to their
avowed purpose would be shifted to those who would sustain them.
While it is possible to conjure up instances where the sign-posting
regulations might aid in preventing fraud 23 and thus satisfy the test
of due process (the instant holding non obstante),24 it is doubtful
whether these mental explanations would suffice as substitutes for
proof when confronted by the objections posed by the demands of
free speech.
19 See State v. Hobson, 83 A. 2d 846, 851 (Del. 1951).2 0 Needham v. Proffitt, 220 Ind. 265, 41 N. E. 2d 606 (1942) ; see McKay
Jewelers v. Bowron, 49 Cal. App. 739, 122 P. 2d 543, 548 (1942). Contra:
People v. Skottedal, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 583 (County Ct. 1951).21 See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 641 (1951) ; Valentine
v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52, 54 (1942).
22 Mr. Justice Stone, delivering the majority opinion for the court, stated
that "[tihere may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of con-
stitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific pro-
hibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938); see
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639
(1943) ; Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 54 (D. Kan. 1945).2 3 E.g., suppose a station owner displays a large sign reading "save four
cents"; a motorist purchases gasoline thinking he is saving four cents per
gallon. After the gasoline is in his tank, he is informed that the saving ap-
plies to the purchase of tires, and not gasoline. A recent case (unreported)
before a Justice of the Peace in Pennsylvania involved those very facts. The
defendant was convicted. Compare the provision of the Delaware statute to
the effect that ". . . no signs designed or calculated to cause the public to
believe that they state or relate to the price of motor fuel ... shall be posted
or displayed . . . ." 48 LAws oF DEL.AWARE c. -, § 1 (1951).
24 Cases cited note 17 supra.
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